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Abstract. Recent work has begun exploring the characterization and
utilization of provenance in systems based on the Service Oriented Ar-
chitecture (such as Web Services and Grid based environments). One of
the salient issues related to provenance use within any given system is
its security. Provenance presents some unique security requirements of
its own, which are additionally dependent on the architectural and en-
vironmental context that a provenance system operates in. We discuss
the security considerations pertaining to a Service Oriented Architecture
based provenance system. Concurrently, we outline possible approaches
to address them.
1 Introduction
The concept and utilization of provenance has been recently explored in the
areas of Grid and Web Services-based systems and environments. The myGrid
project implemented a system for recording the documentation of process in
the context of in-silico experiments represented as workﬂows aggregating Web
Services [4]. The GriPhyn Virtual Data System project provides a set of tools for
expressing and executing workﬂows in a Grid environment, where the deﬁnitions
of the workﬂows are speciﬁed in a high-level workﬂow language and are stored in
a catalog to provide for tracking of provenance of all ﬁles derived by the workﬂow
[3]. A trial implementation of an architecture based around a workﬂow enactment
engine was used to demonstrate several mechanisms for handling documentation
about the invocation of various Web Services was presented in [7].
Most of the work described however does not explicitly consider security
requirements revolving around the utilization of provenance. Such an omission
will hinder eventual evolution of these systems to industrial strength level, where
security is likely to be of primary consideration. This is particularly applicable
where provenance is concerned with information of a commercially or legally
sensitive nature. Our paper seeks to address this shortcoming by analyzing some
of the security issues that arise within a generic provenance system based on a
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA). The primary contributions are:– Discussing basic security issues within such a system;
– Discussing security issues that arise from scalability concerns.
In the next section, we provide a brief description of the provenance represen-
tation we employ; the motivation and justiﬁcation for this type of representation
has been covered extensively elsewhere ([6,5]). The basic security issues a prove-
nance architecture employing this representation are expounded upon in length
in Section 3. Section 4 examines new issues that arise as a result of attending to
scalability concerns, and we conclude in Section 5.
2 Provenance representation
We discuss provenance in the context of the Service Oriented Architecture view
[2], which provides the underlying architectural basis for the Web Services / Grid
environment. In this view, services are simply considered as components that
take inputs and produce outputs, which can be brought together to solve a given
problem typically via a workﬂow that speciﬁes their composition. Interactions
with services take place using messages that are constructed in accordance with
service interface speciﬁcations. In a SOA, clients typically invoke services, which
may themselves act as clients for other services; we use the term actor to denote
either a client or a service in a SOA. We refer to the execution of a workﬂow
that is composed of these interacting actors as a process.
We adopt the following deﬁnition for provenance within an SOA: the prove-
nance of a piece of data is the process that led to that piece of data. Such a
provenance will be represented by some suitable documentation of the process
(i.e. workﬂow execution) that led to the data ([6,5]). It is possible to distinguish
between a speciﬁc piece of information documenting some step of a process from
the whole documentation of the process. We refer to the former as a p-assertion,
which is essentially an assertion made by an actor pertaining to any aspect of a
process. Equivalently, the documentation of a process would therefore consist of
a set of p-assertions made by all the actors involved in that process.
The various logical components of an architecture for a SOA-based prove-
nance system is detailed in [8]. For purposes of our discussion in the following
chapter, we note that the key feature of this architecture is a dedicated reposi-
tory for holding only process documentation, which we term a provenance store.
Actors creating p-assertions about a particular process store them into a prove-
nance store. Actors who wish to answer provenance queries (i.e. queries about
the provenance of various data items produced during that process) would sub-
mit these queries in an appropriate format to the provenance store, which in
turn would return the set of p-assertions holding the necessary data required to
answer the query.
3 Security issues in a SOA provenance system
We classify our discussion into several main areas of security concern:3.1 Enforcing access control over process documentation
An obvious security requirement is the need to control access to process docu-
mentation. Access control to data in general is a well studied subject for which
many practical techniques already exist. A typical approach in many of these
techniques is to identify the sensitivity of information within a speciﬁc data item
(a database record, for example) and then restrict access to a user base in accor-
dance to their predeﬁned roles or identities. Extending this idea directly to our
provenance system by restricting access on the basis of individual p-assertions
may not be useful, as p-assertions do not generally provide much useful infor-
mation if accessed as individual data items. Rather, information about a speciﬁc
aspect of a process (such as all the services that participated in the produc-
tion of the ﬁnal result of a workﬂow) would be obtained by processing the data
contained within an appropriate aggregation of p-assertions from the entire set
of p-assertions that constitute the process documentation for the workﬂow in
question.
A useful way then to delineate access control boundaries in this example
might be to identify diﬀerent types of provenance related information with dif-
fering levels of sensitivity that can be obtained from processing diﬀerent groups
of p-assertions, and then structure access control on the basis of these groups.
Since it is likely that a single p-assertion can belong within many groups, there is
now the problem that a user without access to a designated group of p-assertions
for a speciﬁc purpose may still be able to gather together all the constituent p-
assertions of this designated group via his or her access to other grouping of
p-assertions that inadvertently contains smaller parts of this designated group.
A possible solution may involve supporting the speciﬁcation of access control
authorizations at the granularity of these groups and their associated provenance
queries. In addition, suitable cryptographic protocols can be used to ensure that
users cannot access data within a set of p-assertions returnd as a result of a
provenance query, unless they have access rights to all the groups that those p-
assertions belong to. This may involve, for example, encrypting portions of the p-
assertions in certain ways, associating and distributing secret keys in association
with the relevant access rights to groups and ensuring that decryption can only
occur under speciﬁc conditions.
We believe that this problem presents a unique angle on access control for
data from the perspective of the data being process documentation in a prove-
nance system. More in-depth investigation into this aspect is required if coherent
access control on process documentation and the subsequent provenance related
information derivable from it is to be achieved in industrial strength provenance
systems.
3.2 Trust framework for actors and provenance stores
In a large scale distributed environment, actors that create and store p-assertions
regarding speciﬁc events of interest may not be directly under the control or
even known to actors that will eventually use these p-assertions in some mannerto answer a provenance query. Signatures provide a way to link actors with p-
assertions they create; a methodology is now needed to provide a trustworthiness
measure or rating to speciﬁc actors and their p-assertions. Ratings could be based
on independent third party ratiﬁcation of the accuracy of the p-assertions or
subjective opinions of all potential consumers of p-assertions produced by speciﬁc
actors. The methodology could also include methods to provide an aggregated
measure of reliability of information obtained from processing a group of p-
assertions with diﬀerent levels of associated trustworthiness.
Similar comments are equally applicable to provenance stores; querying ac-
tors could elect to establish trust in provenance stores instead and assume that
the stores will in turn assume the responsibility of ﬁltering p-assertions from the
various actors that send p-assertions to it for storage. There is clearly some work
to be done in articulating the various trust models and relationships possible be-
tween actors producing and utilizing p-assertions as well as the provenance store
holding these p-assertions. Work of this nature could ideally draw on existing
extensive work in the area of trust and reputation in agent mediated interactions
[11].
3.3 Accountability and liability for p-assertions
An important consideration in any provenance system is the accuracy or objec-
tivity of the documentation recorded. In our representation, a p-assertion is a
statement about some aspect of a process by an actor. From a more abstract
viewpoint, this statement is however only a subjective view of that aspect by an
actor. It can be diﬃcult sometimes, if not impossible, to determine how closely
this view tallies with actual reality. This is particularly true in our system,
where all information about past processes is only obtainable via actor-created
p-assertions. With respect to this, it becomes paramount to forge a clear link
between an actor and an assertion that it is responsible for. Such a link, which
can be provided through digital signatures, ensures that responsibility and cor-
responding liability is attributable to the correct actor.
Since p-assertions are created within the context of a process that they de-
scribe, actors may elect to include metadata within a p-assertion that links it
to another p-assertion created by another actor within that context. Incorpora-
tion of incorrect metadata in a p-assertion could potentially create a chain of
p-assertions that are incorrectly associated, making it diﬃcult or impossible for
a querying actor to correctly answer a provenance query. Again, signatures on
this metadata ensures responsibility is attributable to the correct actor. We note
that signatures on p-assertions also serve an additional purpose of guaranteeing
their integrity and ensuring that no other parties (for example, the provenance
store or other intermediary actors that access the p-assertions) change them
intentionally or accidentally.3.4 Sensitivity of information in p-assertions
In a basic example, the p-assertion pertaining to a message exchange between two
actors would simply contain the contents of that message verbatim. Depending
on application domain requirements however, parts of the message may need
to be obscured or transformed in some way when they appear in a p-assertion.
A good example of this is found in the electronic health care records domain,
where privacy requirements mandate that patient identity on health care records
be anonymized [10] if the information on the record is being utilized for non-
diagnostic reasons (for example, to answer provenance questions about a medical
process). If p-assertions are utilized in such a context, then certain data items
(such as patient identiﬁers) that are transmitted in cleartext in the original
message exchange between actors must be obfuscated in some manner when
stored as part of any created p-assertion.
Along similar lines, there may be situations where an actor may want to en-
sure that certain parts of the p-assertion it creates is only accessible to certain
parties. In the simplest case, this can be achieved by ensuring the appropriate ac-
cess controls are instituted on the provenance store. However, once a p-assertion
is retrieved from the provenance store, it is very diﬃcult to control which parties
it is subsequently propagated to. If the asserting actor shares a secret key with
certain parties, it can elect to encrypt parts of the p-assertion with this key so
that only those parties are able to view it.
3.5 Long term storage of p-assertions
Another issue surrounding provenance storage is long term archival of p-assertions.
As p-assertions are signed (and possibly encrypted) prior to storage, there will
subsequently be a need to verify the signatures or decrypt them when they are ex-
tracted for processing. The certiﬁcates for the corresponding encryption / signing
keys may expire if the storage duration is substantial, and in extreme cases, the
underpinning cryptographic algorithms may themselves become outdated. Such
issues must be catered for in some way, for example, by having a key archival
facility and re-signing / re-encrypting provenance information periodically over
the intended storage duration.
3.6 Creating authorisations for new p-assertions
It is likely that p-assertions contain or are derived in some fashion from an
existing piece of data in the system. For example, an actor with access to a
database may send a message containing an item from that database to another
actor. This item is likely to have certain access control restrictions enforced upon
it within the security domain of the database in question. When a p-assertion
is created for the transmitted message and recorded to the provenance store,
appropriate authorisations must now be established for this new entry to ensure
that any future access to it is in accordance with the security policies of theprovenance store. Such authorisations may be articulated in the form of access
control at the level of groups of p-assertions, as discussed in Section 3.1.
In many cases, it is useful to relate the authorisation for the newly recorded
p-assertion in some way to the access control restrictions on the original database
item that the p-assertion is based upon. This eﬀectively allows for a more ﬂexible
speciﬁcation of authorisations on p-assertions by taking into account information
other than that found in statically predeﬁned security policies on the provenance
store. A possible approach towards this end is for an actor to submit additional
information along with the p-assertion to be stored. This additional information
would be provided by the actor and can then be utilised in an automated manner
by the provenance store to generate appropriate authorisations for the new p-
assertion.
On the issue of relating authorisations of p-assertions to the authorisations
of the data that the p-assertions are based on, we note that an interesting sit-
uation may sometimes arise where a more stringent level of access control is
mandated on the p-assertions themselves rather than the original data. As an
example, consider a bioinformatics domain, where a new drug might ostensibly
be designed through some dynamic, unplanned novel application of a standard
workﬂow involving publicly accessible data. In such an instance, the exact se-
quence and logic of the workﬂow itself (which can be reconstituted from its
provenance) becomes more valuable than the actual data used in the workﬂow,
hence necessitating tighter access controls on it.
3.7 Summary
The ﬁrst security consideration (Section 3.1) we believe is unique to process
documentation intended for provenance purposes; data intended for generic pro-
cessing is unlikely to have such a requirement. The remaining considerations
however are likely to be applicable as well when considering the securing of ac-
cess to data in the general case. The last two considerations (Section 3.5 - 3.6)
are additional enhancements to a provenance security architecture that already
adequately addresses the core concerns of access control and non-repudiation.
They are not intended to further secure the system, but rather to extend ﬂexi-
bility in the enforcement of security: always an important consideration towards
increasing the acceptance and adoptability of security measures.
4 Scalability related security issues
So far our discussion has revolved around the notion of a centralized provenance
store, but in practice this will inevitably be distributed for the usual reasons of
scalability: the elimination of a central point of failure, the spreading of demand
across multiple stores and the ability for stores to exist in diﬀerent network areas.
In such a situation, related p-assertions (such as p-assertions from two actors
pertaining to a message exchange between them) could be recorded in diﬀerent
provenance stores. Actors may then record pointers or links to other provenancestores additionally with or as part of the p-assertions in order to provide a
trail for interested parties to retrieve related p-assertions. Such links must again
be made attributable to actors through signatures, with a similar motivation as
well. Distributed provenance stores may exist in diﬀerent security domains; hence
parties that are recognized and authorised for speciﬁc actions on a provenance
store in one domain may be unrecognized or be granted diﬀerent access levels in
a provenance store of a diﬀerent domain. In this instance, a federated identity
management infrastructure must be operated and installed in order to permit the
authorised parties to follow the trail of links and retrieve all relevant distributed
p-assertions.
On a similar theme, if p-assertions themselves are copied or moved between
stores that are located in diﬀerent security domains (for example, in staging of
data or for load distribution purposes), the access control restrictions on them
in their new destinations needs to be deﬁned. In the simplest case, the newly
moved or copied p-assertions retain the same access control restrictions that
were associated with them in their original domain and the federated identity
infrastructure will function to ensure that any newly introduced identities are
recognized appropriately in the correct domain.
5 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we provide a representation for provenance in a SOA and outline
a logical architecture for a generic provenance system based on a SOA. We then
proceed to describe some of the basic security issues pertaining to provenance in
such an environment and possible ways of addressing them. Finally, the notion
of scalability is introduced and the additional approaches required to address the
new security considerations that arise as a consequence are discussed. It should
be noted that all of these security issues have not been explored in depth here;
they represent possible pointers to future research on security in provenance
systems.
Related work explicitly investigating provenance-related security issues is still
relatively scarce. In [1], an abstract security model was developed by identifying
generic security relevant attributes based on user requirements across a large
range of application domains. The myGrid project [9] also investigated security
issues and solutions, but in a manner that was highly application dependent. Our
work is pitched at an intermediate level between these two extremes; we examine
provenance-related security in a generic manner for an operating environment
based on a SOA.
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